This paper evaluates the impact of austerity measures on national social protection mechanisms and on the European Social Model. The study is based on an in-depth analysis of austerity measures adopted in Italy and Portugal and the evolution of several indicators, such as unemployment rates and the percentage of citizens at risk of poverty.
Introduction
The development of European Economic Governance, and the promotion of austerity policies, whilst addressed mainly at national budgets, entailed a social dimension as well, occasioning a general decrease in the level of protection of social rights linked to public services such as health, social assistance and education. The paper's research develops in two parts. In the first part the focus is on the impact of austerity measures on the protection of social rights at the national level, especially in Portugal and Italy. These two countries have been selected as they represent the two main Union approaches to the financial crisis: on the one hand, Portugal benefited from financial assistance from the EU under specific economic policy conditionality, set out in the Economic Adjustment Programme, signed on 2011. On the other hand, the case study of Italy is interesting in order to question the impact of austerity measures adopted in the field of macroeconomic surveillance. The study will focus on the country-specific recommendations addressed to Italy in 2013 and 2014.
The second part of the paper questions whether austerity measures subsequently impact on national public policies and the current division of competences between the Union and Member States (MS). In the field of public services, the notion of 'Services of General Economic Interest' (SGEIs) is an exemplar of the interaction between MS' competences and EU law. Indeed, the role national welfare policies play in meeting social needs was taken into consideration by the Union legislator through the introduction of SGEIs, defined as 'economic activities which deliver outcomes in the overall public good that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions in terms of objective quality, safety, affordability, equal treatment or universal access) by the market without public intervention.' What is relevant for this study is the division of competences set by Protocol 26 TFEU, where it is recognised that 'the essential role and the wide discretion of national, regional and local authorities in providing, commissioning and organising services of general economic interest as closely as possible to the needs of the users' represents a shared value of the Union (Article 1, Protocol 26 TFEU).
The originality of the study is found in the research question of the second part of the article, namely if austerity policies have limited the margin of discretion enjoyed by MS in the organisation of SGEIs.
The new European Economic Governance
This section aims at demonstrating that social services, traditionally excluded from the sphere of European regulation and left to MS competence, can be indirectly influenced by new economic governance in terms of budgets, policy objectives and the quality of service provided.
New European Economic Governance is the result of the measures adopted in the EU legal order and by the Eurozone MS through international treaties. The impact of this new governance on national polies aimed at protecting social rights varies according to the object of the measures adopted. It is therefore necessary to identify the four pillars that compose new economic governance.
Originally economic governance was structured in two main pillars (de Streel 2013: 455-456 This study will focus on the macroeconomic surveillance and the financial assistance, as the 'budget surveillance pillar' is primarily linked to the single area of the respect of limits set for public expenditure and debt.
Macroeconomic surveillance and country-specific recommendations
The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) is aimed at monitoring, and if necessary correcting, macroeconomic imbalances, and functions in two phases. The first phase consists of 'an alert mechanism which works as a filter' and consists of 'a scoreboard with early warning indicators put in place by the Commission', such as 'current account balance in per cent of GDP', 'net international investment position', 'changes in the house price index' and 'unemployment rate.' IX In the case of 'serious imbalances, the corrective arm of the procedure requires the Member State to put in place a detailed policy plan to achieve their correction and provides means to effectively enforce it.' X The second phase involves the adoption of country-specific recommendations by the Indeed the final document approved by the Council does not expressly refer to specific macroeconomic imbalances, and regarding public services it prescribed general policies to Italy aimed at promoting further liberalisation.
Financial assistance and the conditionality clauses
The fourth pillar of new European economic governance is financial assistance, which can be granted as a measure of last resort in order to restore economic and financial stability in a MS, and at the same time to avoid the spread of the debt crisis to other MS, in order to guarantee the stability of the single currency. However, the Treaty of Maastricht established the 'no bailout clause' that prohibits the Union and MS from being 'liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any
Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project' (Article 125 TFEU).
Therefore in the absence of an amendment to the 'no bailout clause' the establishment of a 'permanent stability mechanism', such as the ESM, XIX required the adoption of an international treaty and the amendment of Article 136 TFEU.
The granting of such financial assistance is subject to 'strict conditionality' (Article 136(3) TFEU), which means that the MS has to adopt a program of macroeconomic structural reforms negotiated with the Commission, together with the European Central Bank. These measures are embedded in a 'Memorandum of Understanding' (MoU) and their implementation is subject to constant surveillance and, where necessary, to modifications.
As with the country-specific recommendations, the MoU does not entail a transfer of competences from the MS to the 'Troika' of the Commission, the ECB and the IMF, and it is not an international treaty. Notwithstanding the absence of a legally binding nature, the implementation of the MoU should however be considered as a necessary step in order to obtain financial assistance.
The impact of austerity measures on public services in Portugal
The measures adopted in the granting of financial assistance granted to Portugal give an example of the consequences on the margin of discretion enjoyed by MS in the provision of SGEIs.
On April 2011, the Portuguese government asked for financial assistance from 'the EU, As a consequence the increased number of patients exempt from co-payments because of low income contributed to an increase in the total number of people exempt from the co-payment (see Table 1 ). Nonetheless in a context of high level of unemployment, this category appears to be the most affected. The second measure contained in the MoU aimed at the regulation of the value of copayments in order to encourage 'the use of primary over emergency care' (Table 2) (Rodrigues 2014: 4). to note that the austerity measures imposed by the Troika limited MS discretion in establishing the amount of the co-payment for emergency and primary care and in identifying the categories of people that enjoy an exemption from the co-payment. As will be analysed in the following paragraph, it is relevant to interpret the regulation of services imposed by the Troika in the light of the provision of the Treaties.
The MoU included demands for a reform of the 'unemployment insurance system.'
XXXI
The Portuguese system of insurance comprises two types of benefit, 'one is purely contributory ('subsídio de desemprego'-SD) and the other is means-tested ('subsídio social de desemprego' -SSD) ' (Pedroso 2014: 23) . While the first, SD, is based on the contributions paid by the beneficiary, the second, SSD, is granted 'to the poorer unemployed if they do not qualify for the SD or when the period for which the beneficiary can receive the SD is over' (Pedroso 2014: 23) .
During the first period of the crisis, from 2009 to 2011, the general approach adopted by the government was aimed at enhancing the access to these benefits. XXXII The agreement in the MoU determined a drastic change in the policy of the government. Indeed the MoU called for a reduction of the 'maximum duration of unemployment insurance benefits to no more than 18 months,'
limiting the 'unemployment benefits at 2.5 times the social support index (IAS) and introducing a declining profile of benefits over the unemployment spell after six months of unemployment (a reduction of at least 10% in the benefit amount).' XXXIII In order to diminish the impact of these measures a reduction in the 'necessary contributory period to access unemployment insurance from 15 to 12 months' was established and the Troika asked the government to adopt 'a proposal for extending eligibility to unemployment insurance to clearly-defined categories of self-employed workers providing their services to a single firm on a regular basis.'
XXXIV
In times of crisis, characterised by high rates of unemployment and economic recession, social benefits such as unemployment subsidies and the 'minimum guarantee income' play a fundamental role in protecting the more vulnerable groups of civil society.
As shown by Table 3 E -110 In relation to Italy, a Caritas 2014 report noted that the Italian 'social welfare system is not well placed to deal with the impact of the crisis, nor of the austerity measures.' XLII Among the factors taken into account in this assessment was the absence of a 'nationwide minimum income system,' as this leaves 'some workers, such as those on temporary contracts, with no safety net if they lose their jobs.'
XLIII
The first aspect to be considered is the growth in the unemployment rate, especially since 2010 (Table 4 ). Among the States that are members of the OECD, Portugal 'is one of the countries in which the increase in the unemployment rates has been greatest since the start of the crisis (along with Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Slovenia).' The picture appears even bleaker when the increase in the numbers of young people who are neither in employment nor education or training (NEETs) is taken into account. This is particularly true for Italy, where the rate of NEETs is above 20% of the young adult population, though similar rates are visible in Bulgaria and Greece.
XLIV
These figures are particularly relevant for the present study as they call into question the role of social protection mechanisms, which have traditionally been central in preventing those who are unemployed from falling into poverty.
The portion of the population considered 'at risk of poverty or social exclusion' in Portugal appears to be stable and in line with the European average. In Italy, however, where in 2012 that portion amounted to almost 30% (Table 6) , it presents serious concerns. People who are unemployed run a higher risk of falling into the category of those considered 'at risk of poverty or social exclusion'. In 2012 almost 34% of unemployed people in Portugal were at risk of poverty, and in Italy the figure stood at 38% (Table 7) . 
LIII
The CES also expressed concerns regarding the extended programme of privatization taking place in Portugal, given that changes to public services may have major consequences for both the economy and society as a whole. In many cases the measures concern companies that provide services of general interest, which have a strategic importance for the country. According to the CES, particular attention should be paid to the quality of, and access to, public services, as well as to the State's ability to intervene in the management of the economy. 
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As the long-term effects of austerity measures are still unknown, the analysis of their impact can only be partial at best, and continued evaluation over time will be necessary. It will, for example, be of interest to monitor the long-term consequences of the co-payment reform currently being carried in the Portuguese public health sector.
The protection of social rights under the European welfare approach
The Space precludes a discussion of constitutional theories on the concept of the Welfare State, and the different models of social protection adopted by the legal systems of the various MS, but it is necessary to underline that social rights require public action aimed at guaranteeing an adequate standard of living. In this respect, together with civil and political rights, social rights are fundamental to the concept of 'citizenship' (Marshall 1950: 10-11) .
One of the differences between civil and social rights is that the latter can only be achieved and protected through the involvement of the State, which determines expenses. This means that social rights must, by definition, have a financial impact on national budgets. The data presented in the previous section and the content of the measures adopted in the context of new economic governance demonstrate that, between these two main models, the 'exception' interpretation now predominates. Indeed, as a consequence of the implementation of austerity measures, the 'European Social Model' 'has been subject to a much more generalized calling into question' (Degryse et al. 2013: 5) . 
New economic governance and the emergence of an original approach towards

SGEIs
New European economic governance has not only had an impact on the definition of SGEIs, it has also changed the approach towards SGEIs in general.
The definition of the 'economic' nature of services in the area of competition and internal market is influenced by various elements, such as the principle of solidarity, the exercise of public authority, and the definition of a service provided for remuneration.
However the exact impact of services on national budgets has not traditionally been an area of concern for EU law.
In sharp contrast to this, under new economic governance the 'economic' notion seems to be linked to the financial sustainability and efficiency of the service provided by the State. In this perspective austerity measures have introduced a new approach to SGEIs, comparable to approaches adopted under competition and internal market law.
The intervention of the Troika in several public services has been criticized, as 'ideally, policy decisions should be guided by a focus on enhancing value in the health system rather than on identifying areas in which cuts might most easily be made.' 
Conclusions
The process of 'Europeanization' of public services, and their increasing assimilation into the sphere of influence of EU competition and internal market rules, has been counterbalanced by the recognition of their role in the construction of a 'European social model'.
The sovereign debt crisis could be seen as a new phase in this process. As has been shown, new economic governance enlarged the sphere of influence of EU law in public services, placing a strong focus on the financial implications of the provision of these services.
The analysis carried out has demonstrated that measures adopted in the field of new XVIII Those indicators are: the current account balance, the net international investment position, the export market shares, the nominal unit labour cost, the real effective exchange rates, the private sector debt, the private sector credit flow, the house price index, the general government sector debt, the unemployment rate (European Commission, Scoreboard for the Surveillance of Macroeconomic Imbalances, 
